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ABSTRACT 
Following previous research carried out by Chalari (2014; 2015), this 
qualitative study explores the ways in which the younger generation in 
Greece and UK has been affected by austerity policy measures. These 
two countries have been at the forefront of intense social, political and 
economic transformations that have impacted particularly on young 
people’s current and future lives. This study aims to explore similarities 
and differences in young people’s subjective experiences and responses, 
as from this it may be possible to discern whether there is a general, 
long-term negative effect of austerity across Europe. The data shows 
that there are some similarities in the two cohorts’ subjective 
experiences and responses, but perhaps more interestingly some 
significant differences. The study discusses what the implications of 
these differences might be for young people and society in these 
countries, in terms of their impact on the abilities of the younger 
generation, in a way that has the potential to destabilize their personal 
and professional lives now and in the future. 
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A Comparison of Subjective Experiences and 
Responses to Austerity of UK and Greek 
Youth 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since 2010, many European countries have faced severe economic 
crises, resulting in various forms of ‘austerity’ measures (Lapavitsas et al, 
2010). Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and the UK have all 
experienced austerity (Rudig and Karyotis, 2013), with Greece in 
particular enduring the most intense draconian structural, political, 
economic and social adjustments (Chalari, 2012, 2015, Kretsos, 2014, 
Papavasileiou and Lyons, 2014). Busch et al (2013) have identified that 
these austerity policies are having a significant impact on the European 
Social Model in terms of causing growing unemployment, falling real 
wages, cuts in the social security system and privatisation of public 
property across the EU as a whole.  While it is important to note that 
these austerity measures are affecting different groups in different ways, 
the impact on young people can be seen as particularly deleterious. For 
example, according to Antonucci et al (2014: 14), in contrast to previous 
generations, young people in contemporary Europe experience a 
fragmented and uncertain reality, meaning that young people in 
contemporary Europe are perceived as the first generation to do worse 
than their parents (Hamilton, Antonucci and Roberts, 2014). 
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Research in Greece shows that young people have felt the impacts of 
austerity much more than any other demographic (Kretsos, 2014). For 
example, youth unemployment (under the age of 25) in Greece remains 
the highest, along with Spain, at almost 49% (Eurostat, 2015).  
Additionally, Papavasileiou and Lyons (2014: 4) highlight the fact that an 
increasing number of Greek Millennials (aged 18-22) must now work 
while studying, having lost traditional parental support due to parents’ 
reduced incomes or unemployment. Research by Chalari, (2014a) has 
shown that the younger generation in Greece narrates experiences of 
uncertainty, disappointment, pessimism, insecurity, fear, anger, 
negativism, pressure, anxiety and depression. It is further argued that 
the prospect of unemployment is what younger Greeks (aged 20-30) 
mainly worry about.   
In Britain, the younger generation have also suffered from continuous 
cuts in terms of social benefits (Unison, 2015).  This has resulted in a 
weaker social welfare provision, higher dependency of younger 
individuals on family support, and greater individualism which can lead 
to further intensified experiences of social exclusion (Sealey, 2014). 
However, it seems that austerity in the UK is not as harmful as the crisis 
turned out to be in Greece, although it may have had some impact on 
the vote for Brexit.   
The aim of this research is to contrast the responses to austerity of 
Greek and British young people to see whether similarities and/or 
differences emerge. Although austerity is not perceived in similar terms 
in these two countries, it remains vital to realise that in both cases (and 
perhaps in the entire Eurozone), the younger generation has suffered 
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the consequences of austerity to a greater extent compared to the wider 
population. This builds on a previous piece of research carried out by 
Chalari (2014, 2015), which noted that as a consequence of the 
significant effects of austerity evident in Greece, the subjective 
experiences of different generations indicate different areas of social 
and psychological complexities and in particular, the subjective 
experiences of the younger generation reveal a wide range of negative 
emotional destabilization associated with a severe inability to plan their 
future lives in a personal or professional level. This study aims to explore 
further whether this is also the case regarding the British young people 
in this research, as by studying their subjective experiences in 
comparison to Greek young people, it may be possible to discern 
whether there are general, long-term negative effects of austerity across 
Europe that are impacting on the ability of the younger generation in a 
way that has the potential to destabilize their personal and professional 
lives now and in the future. 
2. Comparing the impact on young people of Greek ‘crisis’ and 
British ‘austerity’ 
 
In Greece the word ‘austerity’ has not been used as systematically as the 
term ‘crisis’ by the media and in everyday conversations. The reason 
perhaps relates to the immediate, intensive and continuous 
enforcement of a number of unprecedented austerity measures, which 
signify the economic and social disorganization of the country, along 
with the media’s selective discourse which concentrates on the Greek 
crisis rather than austerity. As such, measures have not been 
implemented in any other EU country before (Lapavitsas et al, 2010) and 
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the possible political and social consequences have not been effectively 
calculated or, in many respects, even anticipated. In 2016 the national 
debt stood at 185% of GDP, according to the European Commission 
(2016). Further reductions in salaries, pensions and investments are 
anticipated according to the latest Memorandum of Understanding 
(European Commission, 2015), and capital controls were instituted in 
June 2015 to limit both the amount of money that Greeks could 
withdraw and send abroad. The severe measures have been 
accompanied by similarly severe political complications, as during 2015 
Greeks had to elect and re-elect the current coalition government 
consisting of a far left (Syriza) and a far right (Independent Greeks) party, 
who together formed a marginal majority in the Greek parliament. These 
elections also led to the Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party being elected as 
the third most powerful party in the Greek Parliament. Furthermore, a 
referendum also took place in July 2015, which received over 60% of the 
Greek vote against the latest austerity measures.  
The crisis has particularly affected the lives of young people in greater 
intensity compared to other groups (Kretsis, 2014). The main areas of 
young people’s lives that have been altered significantly are 
unprecedented youth unemployment rates (Kretsis, 2014) and massive 
youth emigration of waves of qualified and over qualified young people   
(Labrianidis/Λαμπριανίδης, 2011). Given the high rates of youth 
unemployment, a high, albeit unidentified, number of graduates have 
emigrated, most of whom are overqualified, probably over 120,000 
young professional (Koniordos, 2016). A large part of Greek youth or 
‘new generation’ (as this young age cohort has been defined by 
Manheim, 1997; Joshi et al 2011), has formed large waves of highly 
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qualified professionals migrating to EU, US and Canada (perhaps the 
highest ever) as limited prospects of professional stability or 
improvement are offered back home. Chalari (2014a) has highlighted 
that the narratives of the younger generation in Greece reveal 
experiences of uncertainty, disappointment, pessimism, insecurity, fear, 
anger, negativism, pressure, anxiety and depression. She further argues 
(Chalari, 2015) that the prospect of unemployment is what younger 
Greeks (aged 20-30) mainly worry about. Although Greeks (and 
particularly the younger people) are suffering the negative 
consequences of the prolonged austerity measures, limited evidence is 
available regarding any form of collective form of resistance. Although a 
large number of anti-austerity protests have been organised in Greece 
(and Southern Europe) since 2010, according to Karyotis and Rudig 
(2013) only 29% of their interviewees stated that they had engaged in a 
protest against austerity measures. Such evidence indicates the 
relevantly limited collective reaction (particularly deriving from younger 
people) towards austerity in Greece. Edmunds and Turner (2005:562), in 
their work on emerging global generations, also explain that generations 
alter from being passive into becoming politically active and self-
conscious, when they are able to exploit recourses 
(political/educational/economic), to innovate in cultural, intellectual or 
political spheres. It therefore seems that the Greek younger generation 
remains rather passive, as it has not been able yet to exploit adequately 
any available resources.  
In the UK, it was the election of a coalition government in 2010 that 
signified a focus on ‘deficit reduction’, as expressed through the 
austerity measures in public expenditure and specifically social policy 
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expenditure. As Johnson (cited in Erlanger, 2015) states, ‘by historical 
standard there has been significant austerity’ in the UK.  For example, 
there has been £36 billion worth of public expenditure cuts at the end of 
2014, with another £55 billion worth of cuts planned for 2015-2019 
(Office for Budget Responsibility, 2014).  This means that, as Graph 1 
shows below, at the time of writing total public expenditure is projected 
to fall to its lowest levels in 80 years by 2018-19. 
Graph1. Total public expenditure and receipts, 1948-2019. 
 Source: OBR, 2014. 
Following the notorious statement in 2012 regarding Greek corruption, 
of the Greek socialist politician Theodoros Pangalos “We all ate it 
together” (e-kathimerini.com, 2012) a consistent and totemic slogan 
from the British government in relation to its austerity measures is that 
‘We’re all in this together’, meaning that the impacts of austerity have 
been shared among different groups.  However, this claim has been 
challenged by a number of authors (see, for example, Steans and 
Jenkins, 2012; O’Hara, 2014; Bradshaw and Main, 2014).  In particular, 
such authors argue that the effects of austerity are unequally 
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distributed, and it is young people for whom the cuts have had the most 
effect in a number of ways. For example, since 2010 young people in UK 
have seen continuous changes in their entitlement to social policy 
benefits. In some instances, benefits have been removed altogether, 
such as in relation to the Education Maintenance Allowance for young 
people in further education. Young peoples’ benefits have also been cut 
and made more selective, such as in relation to the Connexions careers 
advice service, and the Youth Service which has seen up to 2000 jobs lost 
and around 350 youth centres closed (Unison, 2015). But perhaps the 
most evident social policy change has been the tripling of higher 
education tuition fees from £3,000 to up to £9,000 per year, a change 
which was strongly resisted by many young people, but which 
nonetheless was carried through. As Sealey (2014:89) observes, ‘This 
and other changes [have] eroded young people’s social rights in 
important areas of social welfare, such as employment and housing, 
[resulting] in a shift for young people away from dependence on the 
state to a prolonged period of dependence on themselves and/ or their 
family’. 
However, the possibility of such dependence on themselves especially 
has been undermined by changes that have occurred in the labour 
market, wherein according to Blanchflower (2015) it is the young who 
have been the biggest losers of austerity in the UK, as they often cannot 
get jobs, and even when they do they are often temporary, low-paid and 
with fewer hours than they would like.  For example, youth 
unemployment is at a record high and three times higher than 
unemployment for older adults (Hills, 2015). This is evident in Graph 2 
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below, which shows the occurrence of 20-24 NEET status (Not in 
Education, Employment or Training) between 2005-2013. 
As Graph 2 shows, the % of NEET young people increased continually, 
peaking at just over 20% in 2012. And although NEET status has declined 
recently, it is still higher than the OECD average (Mirza-Davies, 2015).  
Graph 2. % of NEET 20-24 year olds, UK 2005-2013. 
 
Source: OECD, 2015 
Such continual increases in NEET and the evident lack of policy action 
addressing it suggest an indifference towards young people in policy 
(Sealey, 2014). This indifference has been compounded for young people 
by increases in their income disadvantage that have occurred at the 
same time. For example, Emmerson et al (2015) identify that while real 
earnings have fallen across the board since 2008, there has been ‘a clear 
pattern’ of larger falls in earnings at younger ages, meaning that young 
adults have been one of the groups for which such falls have been the 
most substantial. One reason for this is that cuts in real hourly wages 
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that have occurred since 2009 have been most severe for workers aged 
25 to 35 (Lupton, 2015).  Additionally, ‘under-employment’ (defined as 
workers working fewer hours than they would like), has also 
‘disproportionately’ affected young people (ibid).  This has meant a 
widening of the ‘intergenerational gap’ in incomes and wealth since 
2010, wherein ‘those on lower incomes and those in younger age groups 
are now less financially secure than on the eve of the downturn’ 
(Broughton et al, 2015:4). Such an intergenerational gap is increasingly 
evident in areas such as home ownership, with falls in the likelihood of 
owning a home and increasing household debt, as well as the tripling in 
student tuition fees outlined above.  Specific social policies have also 
widened this intergenerational gap, such as the ‘triple lock’ guarantee 
for the state pension, which has ensured that pensioners’ income and 
living standards have fallen far less than those of young people. More 
recently, the social policy marginalisation of young people has 
continued, as evident in recent proposals from the main political parties, 
such as removing entitlement to housing benefits from some of those 
aged 18–21, and the tightening of the system of entitlement to 
jobseeker’s allowance for those aged under 21. Perhaps not surprisingly 
in the context of such austerity, young people’s subjective experiences 
suggest that the current welfare system is failing them in a number of 
ways (YMCA, 2014). 
There have been two discernible instances of resistance to such austerity 
changes from young people. Firstly, in 2010 there were several 
countrywide demonstrations against the tripling of student tuition fees, 
with the main one in London attracting up to 50,000 mainly young 
people. Secondly, in 2011 several cities in the UK experienced 
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disturbances and riots over a week-long period. Those involved were 
mainly young and male, and demonstrators outlined a number of 
motivating grievances for their involvement – from the increase in 
tuition fees, to the closure of youth services, and the scrapping of the 
education maintenance allowance (Lewis et al, 2011). However, perhaps 
emblematic in this respect was the fact that not only were the central 
claims of these and related instances of resistance ignored, but the 
political discourse articulated in their aftermath, particularly after the 
riots, suggested that the response should focus on a tough, criminal 
justice reaction to the ‘troublesome youth’ who caused the riots 
(Cooper, 2012). Prime Minister David Cameron, in particular, was keen 
to make this point in his speech to the House of Commons a few days 
after the 2011 riots: 
The young people stealing flat screen televisions and 
burning shops; that was not about politics or protest, it 
was about theft … At the heart of all the violence sits the 
issue of the street gangs. Territorial, hierarchical and 
incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young 
boys, mainly from dysfunctional homes. (Hansard, 2011) 
This was stated despite the fact that the majority of those charged were 
actually ‘adults’, not ‘juveniles’ (Ministry of Justice, 2012). This dual 
response of ignoring and pathologising young people’s initial resistance 
to austerity may go a long way to explaining why subsequently, 
instances of resistance have not been as evident. Additionally, the Brexit 
referendum in July 23rd 2016, revealed that younger voters were much 
more likely to vote in favour of United Kingdom to remain as a part of 
the EU (BBC, 2016). This may be an additional indication that the 
younger generation in Britain remain unable to control their own future 
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as the older generations decided the destiny of Britain as a non-EU 
member, whereas the younger generation will actually be the one who is 
going to bear any long-term consequences of this decision.  
It is therefore evident that although UK and Greek economies are not 
equally affected, and therefore austerity measures are concentrated in 
different areas and perhaps are implemented in different ways, the 
younger generation, as a population group, has been affected in a 
profound and intense way. Perhaps the main difference compared to 
older generations is that the younger generation has not been able to 
secure forms of social, political and economic privileges enjoyed by 
previous generations. As a result, any kind of austerity measures aiming 
at a present or future change of social, economic and political 
circumstances leaves them more exposed compared to older 
generations, who might (although not necessarily) have had the chance 
to secure some kind of safety net (through education, employment, 
pension rights, secured property) (Chalari, 2015).   
3. Methods 
 
This research builds on previous research carried out by Chalari (2014; 
2015), and replicates qualitative methods used in the previous study as a 
way to compare the experiences and responses of participants in the 
two countries as closely as possible. As in the previous study (consisting 
of 36 in-depth interviews with Greek participants), we employed semi-
structured interviews, with the questions from the previous study as a 
guide. In line with accepted ethics guidelines, researchers ensured that 
factors such as voluntary participation, informed consent, 
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confidentiality, anonymity, and data storage were adhered to during the 
research process. An opportunistic sampling process was used, as 
participants were undergraduate social science students at the 
University of Worcester. Research consisted of twenty semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews lasting on average 60 minutes. Transcribed data was 
analysed using thematic analysis as outlined by Clarke and Braun (2013). 
The thematic analysis process entailed the systematic familiarisation, 
coding, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining themes and 
writing up of the transcribed data.  
4.  Findings 
 
4.1  Context of current circumstances  
This section compares and contrasts the similarities and differences in 
participants’ current circumstances, principally their economic 
circumstances. It highlights how austerity impacts on participants’ 
everyday lived experiences. 
4.1.1  Personal circumstances 
Participants were asked about the particular effects of austerity on their 
personal circumstances, and some highlighted specific impacts, either to 
themselves or to other family members. These included problems 
accessing healthcare, lack of money, having to work more than one job 
to make ends meet, and rising costs in relation to food. A number of 
British respondents identified the current labour market as a specific 
concern, with high unemployment in particular as a significant issue, but 
this was mainly in terms of impacting on others rather than themselves.  
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The concerns about unemployment in particular were similar to those 
made by the younger participants in the Greek study.    
The specific impacts of welfare cuts were detailed in a number of ways 
such as lack of youth facilities, curtailed access to health services, 
reductions in benefits paid to certain groups, and changes in living 
standards.  A number of participants identified the effect of the welfare 
cuts on families as a particular concern: 
I think looking for work is a big one because there’s just 
not as many jobs out there especially with the service 
sector cuts and stuff like that. It just affects everything 
like food and how much money families have then that 
can affect education and what sort of an education you 
get. (C2P2) 
This particular concern with welfare cuts is in contrast with the Greek 
study, where there seemed to be a more general concern with the 
impact of personal labour changes such as salary reductions, losing their 
jobs or being unable to find a job. This might mean: a) UK offers a more 
advanced welfare support system and therefore any cuts have real 
effects on many people, and/or b) British people rely much more on 
welfare support compared to Greeks who rely more on family support 
(due to lack of welfare state). 
Participants were also in the main aware that their economic 
circumstances in general for young people had changed in relation to 
previous generations. This was related to the housing market, but 
particularly to the change in the labour market away from being able to 
achieve employment on an almost continuous basis, as described below: 
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… so I think that compared with, say, two generations 
like my grandparents’ parents who just walked out of 
school and get a job straight away and so did my mum to 
a certain extent she’s been in the same job for like 28 
years or something. And I don’t think that opportunities 
there as much for people my age. (C2P2) 
Two particular consequences of this were a shift away from reliance on 
the welfare state to having to rely either on family members for support 
or on their own self, as indicated below: 
Yeah, I think currently with the current government we 
have that it’s more on yourself I don’t think that’s a 
positive or negative thing but I think it’s more in we 
should be working to make our own personal lives and 
values better rather than relying on state funding. (C3P3) 
In comparison to the responses of Greek participants, family has been 
the main support system for the younger generation in terms of 
economic and emotional difficulties and needs. The contribution of the 
state is limited, and perhaps for this reason it is not even discussed by 
the participants.  
4.1.2  Increased tuition fees 
As all the participants were students, they would all have been affected 
by the increase in tuition fees in 2011, from £3000 to up to £9000, as 
well as the increased shift from grants to loans, and this was something 
that was specifically outlined. One particular consequence of this was a 
need to work, and the majority of participants worked, some in more 
than one job, or had to rely on other family members for financial 
support. As a result, interviewees expressed a specific anxiety about life 
post-university, especially the possibilities for finding financially 
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rewarding work, and particularly about their ability to pay back their 
student loan in the future:    
Yeah, well obviously I’m gonna have a high debt which 
means I probably won’t be able to get a mortgage till I’m 
older and it’s just not that great having a lot of debt I 
think if I would have enjoyed myself more at uni I 
wouldn’t have had this on my shoulders as well so. 
(A7P7)  
This was not the case for all participants however, and there were quite 
a few who were not particularly worried about the effect of the tuition 
fees. There were a variety of reasons for this, such as not seeing it as a 
debt, not concerned about the £21,000 payment threshold, the 
possibility that it could get written off, and seeing the education they 
were receiving as value for money in the longer term in relation to the 
income they would earn: 
Yeah, yeah, I think like knowing I’ve learnt how much we 
have to pay off an when like it’s the whatever we’re 
earning above £21,000 for example not the whole lot 
gets taken away, and then it gets written off after 30 
years. But also my degree will really take me to a career 
rather than doing another degree which I still have to do 
then, so yeah that’s the reason the good degree itself is 
valuable. (M3P3) 
The status of being a student had a contradictory impact on participants’ 
current circumstances. On the one hand, the financial consequences of 
going to University meant that there was a degree of pessimism about 
the debt that resulted from it, as also indicated in the quote above, and 
this was reflected in the other responses.  
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On the other hand, for some participants the fact of being a student had 
improved their economic circumstances and made them feel better off: 
Well, like I said before I feel very guilty because I’m better 
off, I’m as a student even though I know most of it is 
loans, I’m living a better life than when I was that’s 
generally because I’ve moved 130 miles. But then it’s 
hard to look back, I’m very grateful for where I am but 
then I want everyone else to be happier. (A3P3)  
The entire discourse regarding the negative or positive effects of the 
increased tuition fees is at odds with the narratives of Greek 
participants, as in Greece higher education remains (in most cases) free 
of charge. The status of a student in the Greek context is usually 
perceived in two ways: a) a kind of ‘privileged’ position as the expenses 
associated with the student’s studies are primarily covered by the family 
(although very often students work part-time on a temporary basis to 
support their income); or b) a kind of ‘deprived’ position as students are 
usually seen as a potentially qualified unemployed work force. In both 
cases, tuition fees do not constitute a main concern.  
4.1.3  Comparison with other countries 
Furthermore, a number of participants stated that their current 
economic circumstances were good, or that they felt or were feeling 
better off than before. For some, this feeling of being better off was a 
result of a direct comparison of the situation in other countries:  
…I’m aware that we’re in a better position than other 
countries so that’s good. (M3P3) 
 
I’d say they were improving but I think we’ve got a long 
way to go currently, I think it’s better than some other 
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countries I think in the EU but not as good as others. 
(C3P3) 
 
I think over here in the UK we’re better off than most 
other countries, but other countries are suffering more 
and things like that. Yeah, so I’d say we’re better off than 
others, but we’ve not always been like that. (A7P7) 
 
Erm, I mean I think that in Britain we are really we do 
really well like we are a western country for such a small 
island really, we do do quite well just think there’s some 
things that need to be sorted out. Yeah, but I mean I feel 
I don’t feel great about it but I think that I am very 
pleased and happy and grateful to be born in Britain 
considering the economic circumstances. (A5P5) 
This is in contrast to the Greek participants, who unanimously and 
unequivocally agreed that the economic situation had gone from bad to 
worse. So whereas uncertainty and insecurity were the main themes 
from the Greek interviews, this was not the case for the British 
interviews.   
To summarise this section, there were specific impacts on British 
participants as a consequence of austerity, and this impacted on their 
current circumstances. The most obvious impact was in relation to the 
increase in tuition fees, but there were also impacts in the labour market 
and other welfare provisions, as with the Greek participants. There were 
some negative outcomes from these changes as described by 
participants, but we would perhaps have expected the participants as 
young people to be more pessimistic and anxious about the changes that 
have occurred, as was the case with the Greek participants, bearing in 
mind that it is young people who have borne the brunt of welfare 
changes. However, a significant proportion saw either no negative 
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impact or positivity in the changes to their circumstances, especially in 
comparison to other groups, and this is a significant difference from the 
Greek participants. This was primarily linked to being a student, which 
seemed to cushion the impact of the changes on British young people, 
whereas the Greek young people were not necessarily students and so 
were not cushioned in the same way. 
4.2  Emotions 
This section provides a comparison of the emotions expressed by 
participants in their response to austerity. Its focus is on how austerity is 
driving these emotions, and concomitantly how these emotions are 
driving their actions. 
4.2.1  Similarities in emotions 
Both British and Greek participants shared feelings of uncertainty, 
anxiety, worry about high unemployment rates, and concerns that the 
future would be worse. They all detailed that economic restrictions were 
being experienced first-hand and this resulted in prolonged feelings of 
pessimism and disappointment. Most of the British participants reported 
negative and pessimistic feelings about the future and especially about 
the prospects for unemployment, and expressed anger and worry that 
new cuts would be introduced and unemployment rates would increase. 
Additionally, many British participants expressed the fear that things 
would get worse, and expressed pessimism for the next generation of 
young people: 
I feel sorry for the next generation. Erm, I think it’s gonna 
be harder for them when they grow up, especially as a 
parent myself that’s why I have my concerns of how my 
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little one’s gonna get on and how he’s gonna be able to 
progress in the way that the situation is at the moment. 
(A2:P2) 
Greek participants also reported clearly negative projections about the 
future of Greece and fears about even more difficulties. This negativism 
is quite clearly expressed through their pessimism about the future and 
how hard they have to try in order to live with such uncertainty and to 
adjust to the new reality.    
British participants’ negativity about the situation was also expressed 
through disappointment with and disconnect from the government. This 
disconnect made itself apparent in a feeling of powerless and a 
concomitant disengagement from wider society: 
…a lot of people feel quite disengaged from like society an 
things like that…Like they don’t feel like they have the 
power to change anything so they just kind of go along with 
it as such but don’t agree with it. (C2P2) 
 Similarly, Greek participants of all ages, regardless of social/economic 
class, gender, geographical area, displayed a lack of trust and 
disengagement towards the government. 
4.2.2  Differences in emotions 
A key difference between the emotions expressed by participants of the 
two countries was the emphasis given towards anxiety. While both did 
express anxiety, the way they expressed them was different.   
The frustration reported by certain (not all) British participants described 
circumstances of suffering which not only related to themselves, but also 
to others, especially in relation to other students as detailed above.  The 
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reported feelings of frustration about the current situation was not so 
much on a personal level, but about the impact of the welfare cuts on 
others. For example, a central (and repeated) worry raised by various 
British participants concerned the current and prospective enlargement 
of inequality: 
But generally speaking not personally I would say quite 
pessimistic in terms of the wider public might not because 
of the growth and inequality and everything that goes with 
it. (A4P4) 
Such narratives reveal the increased anxiety about the current but also 
the anticipated future circumstances on a personal and more collective 
level, a concern that was also evident in the Greek responses. 
Anxiety was also reported by British participants in relation to class and 
a class divide:  
I think there’s gonna be a divide whether the people who 
are like higher that class and whether you’ve got the work 
in another class. (A6P6) 
Such an expression of anxiety was not revealed in the Greek responses. 
One of the reasons for this difference might be that although class in 
Britain is somewhat implicit and unspoken about (The Independent, 
1998; Cannadine, 1998), in Greece it is more explicit, and therefore not 
such a surprise as it is to British participants. This means that austerity 
has made the class inequalities more evident to British participants, 
hence the strong emotions regarding this topic. This is in contrast to 
Greek society where class consciousness is not as structured, which 
results in a more fluid class structure in Greece, and hence less of a point 
of issue to Greek participants. 
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4.2.3  Fear vs transformation 
The specific question asked to British participants in relation to austerity 
was ‘This research is about austerity in the U.K. What do you understand 
about austerity’. This question was not asked in the same way while 
collecting data in Greece. However, Greek participants repeatedly spoke 
of a ‘Greek Crisis’, even if they did not use the words ‘austerity’ or 
‘economic recession’. Rather, they were clearly experiencing collectively 
a prolonged period of an ‘economic, political and social crisis’. It seems 
that the kind of impact the ‘crisis’ has on young Greek participants has to 
do with the experience of specific negative and rather harmful feelings 
like those of uncertainty, depression, anxiety and fear about the future. 
It seems that the ‘crisis’ is experienced as something like ‘a new modus 
vivendi’ radically different and new, primarily characterised by fear and 
uncertainty and usually associated with a disastrous outcome. 
However, British ‘austerity’ is not experienced as a new ‘modus vivendi’, 
but rather as a gradual or even on-going transformation, or as an on-
going suffering process, and as something that will affect the future 
rather than the present.  
I think that the quality of life will kind of decrease for a 
greater proportion of people in the UK, because of the 
cuts that are having to be made, and the focus that the 
government are putting on [the cuts]. (M3P3) 
 
I think it can go one of two ways but I think it’s gonna go 
one way, I can’t see that it’s gonna really change in terms 
of economically at all, I can’t see that it’s gonna get any 
better for like working classes or anything like that. 
(C2P2) 
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I’m hoping that obviously the economy’s just gonna kind 
of grow and just get kind of stay stable or just keep 
getting better but obviously the recession came round 
quite quick so you never kind of, it’s almost as if I’m 
waiting for something to go wrong but I’m obviously 
hoping that it’s just gonna get better. (C1P1) 
We should remark here on the role of media, as the concept of Greek 
‘austerity’ is not used as much in Greek (or even international) media. 
However, this is another indication of the difference in the levels of how 
intensively the economic recession is perceived, evaluated and 
ultimately experienced. The repeated use (by the media and public) in 
Britain of the term ‘austerity’ denotes and implies a ‘controllable’ 
problem, able to be resolved, rather an ‘economic crisis out of control’. 
It also implies gradual and smoother, rather than immediate and radical, 
economic adjustments. 
4.3  Levels of optimism 
There was a marked contrast in the levels of optimism, notwithstanding 
the pessimism outlined above. For instance, some British participants 
regarded the current economic situation as ‘good’ compared to other 
countries, and they also seemed more optimistic about the future: 
I’m confident that they’re just gonna get better to be 
honest I feel like I think the progress that has been made 
I don’t think it’s all just gonna go to waste I think it’s just 
gonna carry on getting better. (C1P1) 
Some realised that they were in a better situation because as students 
they had access to a steady income from tuition fees, and felt lucky as a 
consequence of this, and had optimism that a university degree would 
secure a better future:  
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…now I know I stand a chance of getting that so I do have 
optimism there. (A4P4) 
None of the Greek participants expressed any kind of optimism, 
although many of them were students who had similarly secured the 
funding for their studies (through family support). They did not feel that 
any degree might help them to get a job and they were focused on what 
was going to happen after they graduated rather than evaluating their 
privileged status as students. For example, the notion of leaving the 
country as a response to the current economic circumstances was 
something that was evident in a number of the Greek respondents, but 
this was not mentioned once by the British respondents. Thus, there is a 
contrast, wherein it seems that the kind of impact the ‘crisis’ has had on 
young Greek participants is particularly damaging. This orients the crisis 
period experienced as something radically different and new, and the 
definitive feeling that things will ultimately end badly.  However, the 
British participants’ experience is of a gradual or even ongoing 
transformation that could eventually end up making things worse 
particularly for people with lower income.  
To summarise the analysis, there were similarities in terms of the 
negativity and pessimism towards the future expressed by participants. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this negativity and pessimism made itself 
apparent in a disappointment and disconnect with not only the 
government, but also a concomitant disengagement from wider society. 
On the other hand, while anxiety was a key emotion expressed by 
participants in both countries, this was expressed in different ways, 
collectively in Britain and individually in Greece. The expressions of 
anxiety towards growing class inequalities in Britain presented a 
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particular contrast. For Greek participants, it seems that the ‘crisis’ is 
being experienced as something like a new ‘modus vivendi’ radically 
different and new, primarily characterised by fear and uncertainty and 
usually associated to a disastrous outcome. This is in contrast to the 
British experience as a gradual, long-term transformation, or as an 
ongoing suffering process, and as something that will affect the future 
rather than the present. And while none of the Greek participants 
expressed any emotions of optimism, this was in contrast to the 
optimism of certain British participants. This orients the emotions 
experienced by the Greek participants as definitively bad, which is 
divergent from the British participants’ emotions as something which 
could eventually end up making things worse, although not at this point 
in time.   
5. Discussion 
 
This study revealed some similarities in participants’ experiences of 
austerity, but some profound differences. In both instances, we saw 
what we can refer to as forms of ‘social change’, which broadly concern 
‘relatively lasting transformations of social features, such as structures 
and institutions, norms, values, cultural products and symbols’ (Calhoun, 
1992, cited in Silbereisen et al., 2007: 73). However, as Pinquart and 
Silbereisen, (2004: 289) observe, social change ‘may occur gradually or 
become the result of sudden and dramatic transformations of political, 
social and economic institutions as was the case with the breakdown of 
the communist system in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’. In this 
context, one particular difference was how Greek participants described 
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their experiences as akin to an intense and rapid change of the 
prominent norms, an almost violent transformation of their everyday 
life, of their feelings, their concerns and ability to cope with the rapidly 
changing reality. Thus, they experienced the changes as akin to the 
disorganization of the social, political and economic system, which was 
followed by ‘challenging customary interpretations of reality and 
undermining established routines’ (Elder, 1974: 10). In contrast, British 
participants did not describe such a sudden and dramatic 
transformation; rather, participants referred to a continuing and 
perhaps even calculated process of change and readjustment, wherein 
while they were able to depict several enduring social transformations 
that were taking place, this was experienced as a gradual, albeit 
sometimes unfair and painful adjustment. Thus, it seems particularly 
appropriate to characterize British participants’ experiences of austerity 
as challenging and infused with everyday anxieties and tensions, which, 
however, seem more like a continuing life struggle rather than a series of 
unexpected and threatening social, political and economic 
transformations.   
That anxieties and tensions were evident is not surprising when 
considering, as set out in the introduction, UK youth are the 
demographic for whom austerity has had the most negative impact 
within the UK, in terms of policy changes and outcomes. Within the 
research, some of these negative impacts were apparent, such as an 
increased level of debt, the increased reliance on self, and the concern 
with rising inequality. From such outcomes we could expect participants’ 
responses to reflect research studies which have shown that the effects 
of austerity measures are affecting young people more strongly than 
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other groups (Hamilton et al, 2014). On the contrary, however, what is 
striking is the level of optimism and positivity for the future that certain 
participants displayed, and this is also significantly different from the 
almost universal levels of anxiety and pessimism from the Greek study. 
This is perhaps contrary to what we might have expected, bearing in 
mind the changed circumstances of young people in the UK. This 
acceptance and concomitant optimistic outlook could also explain the 
lack of direct resistance shown by the participants to the austerity 
changes in general, as evident in the interviews.  
One of the reasons for this optimism for the future was from the status 
of being a student, which seems to have shielded students from the 
worse effects of austerity, and so the sample frame itself might have 
been a contributory factor to this optimism, and a different sample of 
non-students might have provided a different response. 
Notwithstanding this possibility, there might have been some 
expectations that this increased level of debt might have had a negative 
effect on participants’ outlook, but this was not really evident. Rather, 
there was an explicit acceptance of the increased debt as something that 
could be lived with in the future, and so this did not have an effect on 
participants’ outlook. So the question remains why such an optimistic 
outlook, despite the changed circumstances?   
Possible reasons for this could be indeed that as they described, on the 
one hand the participants in the study were indeed better off than 
previously, and so this optimism is grounded in reality. This could be a 
direct impact of the increased tuition fees on participants’ monetary 
circumstances (i.e. securing funding for studying at the University), 
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which improved their economic circumstances and acted to cushion 
participants from the worse effects of austerity. It could, alternatively, 
be reflection of the primarily lower middle class background of students 
who were interviewed. Despite being from such a background, the 
participants were not the working age adults who have been typically 
outlined as having been most affected by the austerity measure. Other 
studies have referred to this and related groups as ‘generation rent’, 
struggling to access homeownership; as ‘skivers’, struggling to cope with 
cuts in unemployment benefits levels and increased sanctions; or as the 
‘squeezed middle’, experiencing falling real wages earnings (Lupton et al, 
2015).  In this sense, the fact of being at University and having access to 
stable and secure monetary sources that they might not have previously 
had access to seems to have enabled them to overcome the ‘precarity’ 
that has been part of the process of deindustrialisation. This precarity 
has been intensified by changes associated with austerity, particularly 
factors leading to downward mobility such as temporary and insecure 
employment, causing temporary and insecure income (Standing, 2011). 
Rather, the UK participants’ responses suggested a stability and security 
in their status that is in contrast to the expectation that, as young 
people, they would feel this ‘precarity’ resulting from austerity, as we 
find in the Greek study. Furthermore, Standing (2011:8) argues that the 
class characteristics of the ‘precariat’ are as follows:   
It consists of people who have minimal trust relationships 
with capital or the state, making it quite unlike the salariat. 
And it has none of the social contract relationships of the 
proletariat, whereby labour securities were provided in 
exchange for subordination and contingent loyalty, the 
unwritten deal underpinning welfare states. Without a 
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bargain of trust or security in exchange for subordination, 
the precariat is distinctive in class terms. 
The research does not really support this, in the sense that the financial 
stability of support given to them as students seemed to provide a social 
contract with participants that may have accounted for their lack of 
impetus towards direct resistance. However, the increased UK student 
debt is a current austerity measure that will have a definitive impact on 
the future of many. For instance, there is the real possibility that while 
employment will be possible, employment at a level that enables them 
to pay back their debt is not necessarily guaranteed. This is where the 
notion of the precariat will have relevance in terms of limiting their 
ability to secure housing, to pursue leisure activities and to plan for their 
or their children’s future.  
This point is reinforced when we look at the experience of young Greek 
people, where debt is having a real impact on their ability to produce 
long-term plans on a personal or professional level. Therefore, whereas 
the Greek debt problem is experienced as more of a macro-economic, 
social and political problem, wherein the debt from austerity is 
subjectively felt as something impacting on the future stability and 
economic prospects of the whole country, on the other hand in the 
British context it is more of a micro-economic individual problem, 
wherein the debt from austerity is subjectively felt as something that is 
individualised to the person, and therefore within the control of that 
person. This of course does not include the wider government debt. 
Concomitantly, the Greek circumstances show us that once debt 
becomes an emotional and social concern, it has the potential to have 
impact by facilitating prolonged experiences of disappointment, 
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uncertainty, fear, pessimism, insecurity, anger, pressure, anxiety and 
depression. In the longer term this will have implications not just for 
individual countries, but also for the wider European prospect for 
prosperity. Again, this finding may well be contingent on the chosen 
sample frame, and more research on this would help us to understand 
whether other students and other groups of young people are 
experiencing and responding to austerity in similar or different ways. 
However, what remains evident, especially after the Brexit referendum, 
relates to the increasing need to understand, explain and explicitly 
recognise the younger generation’s limited access to the shaping and 
planning of its own future. And such recognition should perhaps be 
further expanded beyond British or Greek national, cultural, political or 
economic boarders, as the younger generation has been customarily 
restricted in terms of future policy planning and making. 
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